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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ____________________ 
 
POLLAK, District Judge.  
 
 In 1981 John E. Dolenc, Jr., was charged with killing 
his wife, Patricia Dolenc, in July of 1975.  The case came on for 
trial before a jury in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny 
County, Pennsylvania.  At the conclusion of the trial, the jury 
returned a verdict finding John Dolenc guilty of murder in the 
first degree.  On September 21, 1981, Dolenc was sentenced to 
life imprisonment. 
 Since he was sentenced, Dolenc has challenged his 
conviction in the Pennsylvania courts both on direct appeal and 
by various collateral proceedings.  In addition, Dolenc has filed 
a series of petitions for habeas corpus in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  All 




 Now before this court is an appeal by the Commonwealth
1
 
from Judge Standish's order of November 10, 1993, dismissing the 
fourth and most recent of Dolenc's federal habeas petitions.  The 
fact that the Commonwealth -- not Dolenc -- is appealing the 
dismissal of the petition poses the jurisdictional question we 
now confront:  Is the Commonwealth, in some legally cognizable 
sense, aggrieved by, and hence entitled to seek appellate review 
of, Judge Standish's order?  To answer this question, we must 
look more closely at the order of dismissal. 
 Judge Standish's order adopted "as the opinion of the 
court" a report and recommendation filed by Magistrate Judge 
Sensenich, on October 13, 1993.  That report and recommendation 
came to two conclusions of law: 
 First, the report and recommendation rejected the 
Commonwealth's submission that Dolenc's fourth habeas corpus 
petition challenging the same conviction constituted an abuse of 
the writ that precluded access to federal habeas corpus:  
Magistrate Judge Sensenich determined that the federal 
constitutional claims central to Dolenc's fourth habeas petition 
were rooted in a decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 
                     
1
.  The nominal appellant is Warden William Love, the official 
who, having custody of John Dolenc, was named as respondent in 
Dolenc's petition for habeas corpus.   It is, however, the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, rather than Warden Love, that is 
the actual adverse party in interest; for that reason, this 





Commonwealth v. Myers, 530 Pa. 396, 609 A.2d 162, which was 
handed down on May 22, 1992, "after petitioner's previous habeas 
petitions were dismissed," and therefore the claims "could 
neither have been presented nor addressed previously." 
 Second, the report and recommendation went on to 
conclude that the new constitutional claims had not been "'fairly 
presented'" to the Pennsylvania courts and, in consequence, 
Dolenc, not having exhausted available state remedies, was not 
yet in a position to present those claims to a federal district 
court. 
 The Commonwealth now seeks review of Judge Standish's 
order dismissing Dolenc's fourth federal petition for habeas 
corpus.  On the face of it, the Commonwealth's posture as 
appellant is unusual:  having prevailed in the district court, 
the Commonwealth would not seem to be so positioned as to be able 
to complain of the victory it won.  The Commonwealth is not, 
however, complaining about the district court's order, which 
dismissed Dolenc's habeas petition.  Rather, what the 
Commonwealth is really complaining about is Judge Standish's 
adoption of the opinion of Magistrate Judge Sensenich -- or, to 
be more precise, the first portion of that opinion:  the ruling 
that Dolenc's fourth habeas petition was not an abuse of the writ 
precluding Dolenc from seeking federal habeas.  The Commonwealth 
fears that the ruling is one which may return to haunt it if 
Dolenc, after unsuccessfully exhausting his state remedies, 
 
 
returns to the district court to seek federal habeas for a fifth 
time.  The Commonwealth anticipates that on such a renewed 
federal habeas application the Commonwealth's renewed abuse-of-
the-writ plea would necessarily be overcome by a determination 
that Judge Standish's adoption of Magistrate Judge Sensenich's 
opinion has made rejection of the Commonwealth's abuse-of-the-
writ contention law of the case. 
 If the Commonwealth is correct in its prediction that 
the opinion would operate as law of the case, the Commonwealth 
would appear to be on firm ground in contending that it has 
standing to appeal.  This would be so because, although 
"[o]rdinarily, a prevailing party cannot appeal from a district 
court judgment in its favor," In re DES Litigation, 7 F.3d 20, 23 
(2nd Cir. 1993), there are "exceptions to this rule," and "[o]ne 
exception arises when the prevailing party is aggrieved by the 
collateral estoppel effect of a district court's rulings."  Ibid.  
But we think the Commonwealth has magnified the legal momentum of 
the portion of the magistrate judge's opinion, adopted as the 
opinion of the district court, to which it takes exception.  We 
perceive no reason why Judge Standish would be precluded from re-
examining the abuse-of-the-writ issue if Dolenc were again to 
petition for federal habeas.  And, a fortiori, this court would 
not be bound to acquiesce in the magistrate judge's and district 
court's 1993 abuse-of-the-writ ruling if we were in the future 
 
 




 In sum, we hold that the Commonwealth, having failed to 
establish that the action of the district court will tie the 
Commonwealth's hands in any potential future phase of this 
litigation, is not aggrieved by the district court's order and 
hence is without standing to appeal.
3
  Accordingly, the appeal is 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
                     
2
.  In rejecting the Commonwealth's view that law-of-the-case 
would insulate the 1993 abuse-of-the-writ ruling from re-
examination in the district court or here, we are not to be 
understood as intimating a view that the ruling was incorrect.  
Because we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to entertain the 
Commonwealth's appeal, we have no authority to consider the 
correctness of the ruling. 
3
.  Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208 (3rd Cir. 1987), is not 
to the contrary.  There we held that a district court's finding 
in an earlier habeas proceeding -- a "finding [that] was part of 
an order [of dismissal] which was not appealed by the state," id. 
at 1218 -- that delay in the state courts was so egregious as to 
excuse a federal habeas petitioner from exhausting state 
remedies, was "not open to collateral attack in this proceeding."  
Ibid.  One member of the Burkett court argued in partial dissent 
that the state could not have appealed from the prior dismissal.  
We rejected that view, but did so on a ground not present in the 
case at bar -- namely, that the order nominally dismissing the 
petition was, in effect, "a conditional grant of Burkett's writ."  
Id. at 1223 n.35.  Our rationale was as follows: 
 
    The partial dissent suggests that Blair 
County could not have appealed the order.  
Post at 1230 n.5.  However, we believe that 
Blair County had standing to appeal.  First, 
it did not, in contrast to the appellant in 
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 87 n.3, 91 S. 
Ct. 674, 678 n.3, 27 L.Ed.2d 701 (1971), 
fully prevail as to all appealable aspects of 
the order.  The order dismissed Burkett's 




Blair County fails to . . . impose any 
appropriate sentence within sixty (60) days" 
-- and ordered Blair County "to act in 
accordance with this directive."  Second, the 
district court would have had no 
constitutional authority to enter such an 
order had no violation been at least 
impending.  On the other hand, a court must 
grant appropriate relief where an existing 
violation is found.   Indeed, having found a 
violation, there was nothing left to be 
decided in a new petition other than the 
remedy.  Unfortunately, however, the district 
court, instead of retaining jurisdiction, 
marked the case "closed."  (Obviously the 
district court did not conceive that the 
county, once warned, would not sentence 
Burkett within 60 days).  Under these 
circumstances, we read the less-than-pellucid 
order, together with the court's opinion, as 
a conditional grant of Burkett's writ. 
 
